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Abstract
Our study aims to analyse the Chinese economic presence in Mozambique 
during the second decade of  the 21st century. This objective emerged from the 
observation of  the visible presence in Mozambique of  several Chinese com‑
panies that intervene in different sectors. The choice of  this period of  analysis 
is mostly related with the lack of  systematized studies about this topic, taking 
also into consideration that, during this period, Mozambique faced an economic 
and financial crisis that resulted from a high debt and that led to the interven‑
tion of  the international community. In order to achieve this goal, a central 
question arises: what are the characteristics of  the Chinese economic presence 
in Mozambique during the second decade of  the 21st century? The first part, 
the framework, briefly describes the Chinese presence in the African continent; 
in the second part, we will address the relationship between Mozambique 
and China and will describe spectrally the economic and financial situation in 
Mozambique; in the third we attempt to estimate the volume of  trade between 
both countries; in the fourth, we analyse China‑Mozambique cooperation and 
China’s Official Development Assistance to Mozambique, and; in the fifth, we 
analyse China’s current foreign direct investment in the country. 
Keywords: China. Africa. Mozambique. Trade Relations. Cooperation. Foreign 
Direct Investment.
Resumo
O nosso estudo procura identificar uma caracterização para presença económi‑
ca chinesa em Moçambique na segunda década do século. Assim, organizámos 
a nossa análise em cinco pontos fundamentais. No primeiro, efetuamos uma 
breve descrição da presença chinesa no continente africano; no segundo aborda‑
mos as relações entre Moçambique e a China e descrevemos a situação econó‑
mica e financeira de Moçambique; em terceiro lugar procuramos quantificar 
as relações comerciais entre os dois países e, num quarto ponto analisamos a 
cooperação e a ajuda pública para o desenvolvimento efetuada pela China em 
Moçambique, para, num quinto ponto analisarmos qual o atual investimento 
direto efetuado pela China naquele país africano.
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Palavras-chave: China em África. Moçambique. Relações comerciais. Ajuda 
Pública ao Desenvolvimento. Investimento Direto Estrangeiro.
Resumen
Nuestro estudio busca identificar una caracterización de la presencia económica 
china en Mozambique en la segunda década del siglo. Por lo tanto, organizamos 
nuestro análisis en cinco puntos fundamentales. En el primero, proporciona‑
mos una breve descripción de la presencia china en el continente africano; en el 
segundo, abordamos las relaciones entre Mozambique y China y describimos 
la situación económica y financiera de Mozambique; en tercer lugar, buscamos 
cuantificar las relaciones comerciales entre los dos países y, en el cuarto punto, 
analizamos la cooperación y la ayuda pública para el desarrollo llevada a cabo 
por China en Mozambique, de modo que, en un quinto punto, analicemos la 
inversión directa actual realizada por China en ese país africano. 
Palabras-clave: China en África. Mozambique, Relaciones comerciales. Asisten‑
cia pública para el desarrollo. Inversión extranjera directa
Introduction
China is now the second largest economy in the world and it pro‑
jects considerable  power‑‑including  economic, military, diplomatic, te‑
chnological, and sharp power‑‑on a global scale.  China’s rise is causing 
substantial shifts in the international order, largely in illiberal and non‑
‑democratic directions.  Analysis of the nature and implications of China’s 
increasingly assertive activities on the global stage is now one of the most 
significant contemporary topics for the study of International Relations.  
The goal of this study is to identify and analyse China’s economic 
and financial presence in Mozambique, with special focus on the second 
decade of the 21st century. We chose this topic due to the visible increase 
in the number of firms operating in Mozambique in several sectors, and 
to the unusual and interesting presence of Chinese personnel in cooper‑
ation projects funded by the Chinese state. We chose this specific period 
because of the scarcity of data and lack of systematic studies on the topic, 
but also because during this period, Mozambique has had to deal once 
again with political and security instability, a debt‑driven economic ex‑
pansion and a financial crisis that required intervention from the interna‑
tional community. 
This paper offers a rigorous, empirically‑grounded case study of 
China’s involvement in Mozambique. But the relevance of the study is 
not limited to Mozambique alone.  By a careful analysis of the case of Mo‑
zambique, the larger aim is to contribute to our understanding of China’s 
growing presence and influence on the continent of Africa, more broadly. 
While there are many academic studies on Chinese‑African rela‑
tions2, and although generic data on the economies of African countries 
is available from accessible and credible sources, studies on Mozambique 
and specifically on the Chinese involvement in the country are scarce. A 
thorough review of the literature revealed little documentation in Por‑
tuguese and English, and what little does exist is scattered across differ‑
ent sources, such as the World Bank (2018), United Nations Conference 
2. There is now a range of authors: 
Alden (2006); Jiang (2009); Mohan 
(2013); Besada and O´Bright (2017).
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on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2018), the Statistical Yearbook of 
Mozambique (INE, 2018), the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation website 
(FOCAC, 2019) and the Macauhub website3.
The first major systematic description of the relations between 
China and Mozambique can be found in a book coordinated by Sérgio 
Chichava and Chris Alden (2012), A Mamba e o Dragão – Relações Moçam-
bique-China em Perspectiva [The Mamba and the Dragon – An Outlook on 
Mozambique‑China Relations]. The book was published in 2012 by the 
Institute of Social and Economic Studies (IESE) and the South African Insti‑
tute of International Affairs.
Additionally, several sectoral studies have been conducted, address‑
ing areas such as the Chinese presence in Mozambique’s agriculture4 and 
forests5, the diplomatic relations between China and Mozambique6, the 
Chinese investment in the country7, Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), the economy and trade8, the impact of FOCAC9, and labour rela‑
tions between Chinese companies and Mozambican workers10.
To achieve the research goal, it was necessary to answer the follo‑
wing research question: What are the characteristics of the Chinese econo‑
mic presence in Mozambique during the second decade of the 21st century?
China’s economic presence, which we will attempt to quantify, can 
be felt in three broad overlapping areas: the first is trade; the second co‑
vers both cooperation and ODA and includes cooperation initiatives and 
projects in various areas; the third area consists of FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment) by a considerable number of Chinese companies operating in 
Mozambique. First, we tried to identify the economic and societal impact 
of the Chinese presence in areas such as employment and socioecono‑
mic development. However, we found that the lack of reliable data, the 
different methodologies used to obtain these data, and the contrasting 
conclusions of the sectoral studies made it impossible to establish a re‑
liable metric to assess that impact. Therefore, we decided to focus only 
on identifying the areas where the Chinese government has intervened, 
providing specific figures when possible.
The research question immediately raised several subsidiary ques‑
tions: What are the trade links between China and Mozambique? What 
characterises China‑Mozambique cooperation? How does China provide 
Official Development Assistance to Mozambique? In what sectors? What 
is China’s FDI in Mozambique and where is it used?
We used an essentially descriptive and exploratory methodological 
approach11 which consisted of analysing data from secondary sources (pu‑
blished studies and documents issued by government sources and Inter‑
national Organizations). The study is organized in five parts, where we 
attempt to answer the above questions. In the first, which introduces and 
contextualises the issue, we briefly describe the Chinese presence in the 
African continent; in the second, we discuss the relations between Mo‑
zambique and China and describe Mozambique’s economic and financial 
situation; in the third, we attempt to assess the volume of trade between 
the two countries; in the fourth, we analyse China‑Mozambique coope‑
ration and the ODA China has made available, and in the fifth we analyse 
China’s current foreign direct investment in this African country.
3. Macauhub available at: https://
macauhub.com.
4. Chichava (2010; 2014).




8. Ilhéu (2010); Roque (2009).
9. Hon, Jansson, Haifang, Burke and 
Kiala (2010).
10. Feijó (2012); Wethal (2017).
11. We used a descriptive approach 
in the sense defined by Gratton and 
Jones (2010), in that we collected data 
that describes facts about the links 
between Mozambique and China, and 
an exploratory approach in the sense 
used by Chui (2007), in as much as we 
explored the relations between China 
and Mozambique to collect knowledge, 
ideas and facts about the research 
problems and to identify variables 
associated with those problems. 
Mlambo et al. (2016) used the same 
methodologies in their article on China-
Africa relations.
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China in Africa
China’s current presence in Africa has been widely documented, 
especially since the creation of the FOCAC in 2000. The FOCAC websi‑
te describes this forum as a “platform established by China and friendly 
African countries for collective consultation and dialogue and a coopera‑
tion mechanism between the developing countries, which falls into the 
category of South‑South cooperation” (FOCAC, 2019). Fifty‑three African 
countries are members of this platform12. 
The last FOCAC summit, the seventh since the forum was created, 
was held in Beijing on 3th and 4th September 2018. The conference aimed 
to develop the Forum’s work and deepen the strategic and cooperative 
partnership between China and Africa. To achieve this goal, the forum 
adopted by consensus the Beijing Declaration “Toward an Even Stron‑
ger China‑Africa Community with a Shared Future”. During the sum‑
mit, the Chinese President stated that “Africa’s infrastructure is seeing 
improvements thanks to these cooperation plans, which are expected to 
bring the continent 30.000‑km of highways, 85‑million‑tonnes per year 
of harbour capacity, over 9‑million‑tonnes per day of water‑cleaning ca‑
pacity and about 20.000‑megawatt power generating capacity, together 
with creating some 900.000 jobs.” Also during the summit, an action plan 
was defined for 2019‑2021 (FOCAC, 2019). With the implementation of 
the Belt One Road Initiative, China’s presence on the African continent is 
expected to become increasingly visible13.
China’s importance to Africa has also been addressed in official 
Chinese documents such as the African Policy Papers of 2006 and 2015. 
In its second Policy Paper (2015), the Chinese government stated that it 
wished to clarify its determination and goodwill to develop friendly and 
cooperative relations with the African continent (CHINA.ORG, 2015)14. 
China’s interest in the continent is also reflected in the number of visits 
by senior Chinese officials to African countries. Between 2008 and 2018, 
there were 79 visits to 43 different countries15.
China is in Africa to gain access to its markets, natural resources, 
investment, and political and diplomatic support16, as well as to project 
military power; in other words, it is defending its own interests.
China projects military power through the forces it deploys to Uni‑
ted Nations peacekeeping missions, the most significant being the mission 
to South Sudan, to which it has committed over one thousand personnel. 
This is a form of power projection and a way to gain access to local oil17. 
China also has forces in Djibouti, where it has established its first military 
base outside the South China Sea. In addition to China, six other powers 
(USA, France, United Kingdom, Japan, Italy and Saudi Arabia) have bases 
in the country. From there, China can control the entire Bab el‑Mandeb 
strait and help protect the region’s shipping routes.
The relationship between Africa and China is one of mutual depen‑
dence. Africa needs China’s assistance to spur its socioeconomic growth 
and development, as well as to gain access to the Chinese markets, in‑
vestments, loans, ODA programmes and technology18. Another equally 
important factor is what we can call mutual political trust, since some 
12. Available at https://www.focac.
org/eng
13. The statement of the FOCAC 
Beijing Summit held in September 
2018 reads: “Africa, being part of 
the historical and natural extension 
of the Belt and Road, has been an 
important participant in this initiative. 
The cooperation between China and 
Africa under the Belt and Road Initiative 
will generate more resources and 
means, expand the market and space 
for African development, and broaden 
its development prospects. We agree 
to form a strong synergy between the 
Belt and Road Initiative and the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development 
of the United Nations, Agenda 2063 
of the African Union (AU), as well as 
the development strategies of African 
countries. The closer connectivity in 
policy, infrastructure, trade, finance and 
people-to-people ties, strengthened 
industrial capacity cooperation under 
the Belt and Road Initiative, and 
greater cooperation in the planning of 
African infrastructure and industrial 
development will lend new impetus to 
the win-win cooperation and common 
development between China and 
Africa”(FOCAC, 2019).
14. Among other aspects, the document 
explains that this cooperation will 
entail: “1. Enhancing political mutual 
trust; 2. Deepening cooperation in 
international affairs; 3. Deepening 
economic and trade cooperation; 4. 
Strengthening development cooperation 
between China and Africa; 5. Deepening 
and expanding cultural and people-to-
people exchanges; 6. Promoting peace 
and security in Africa; 7. Strengthening 
exchanges and cooperation in consular, 
immigration, judicial and police areas” 
(CHINA.ORG, 2015)
15. The Global Sentinel website has 
detailed information on these visits, 
including locations, and dates and the 
names of visiting officials (GLOBAL 
SENTINEL, 2018).
16. A study by Mlambo et al. (2016) 
identifies four key elements of China’s 
goals in Africa: access to resources; 
political support; access to markets; 
investment opportunities. Another study 
by Haroz (2011) identifies three priorities 
in China’s investment in Africa: strategic 
diplomacy, ideological values and 
commercial benefit.
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African political elites find China’s government model more appealing 
than that of Western liberal democracies, as well as less intrusive regar‑
ding domestic issues when granting loans and making investments (BE‑
SADA; O´BRIGHT, 2017).
The Chinese presence in Africa has elicited different reactions and 
arguments from the general public, political elites, and even academi‑
cians. According to Afrobarometer (2016), a survey conducted in 36 Afri‑
can countries revealed that, when asked how they evaluated the Chinese 
influence in their countries, 63% of respondents rated China’s economic 
and political influence as positive. However, some view China as a new 
neo‑colonial power (CLINTON, 2011) that drains countries of their re‑
sources and contributes to underdevelopment and deindustrialisation 
(DE GRAUWE; HOUSSA; PICILLO, 2012), while preventing the world’s 
most vulnerable countries from having control over strategic sectors of 
their economies (ABODOHOUI; SU; DA SILVA, 2018). Other arguments 
are that investing in authoritarian countries only benefits corrupt politi‑
cal elites and that there have been reports of Chinese firms not complying 
with local labour laws (ABODOHOUI; SU; DA SILVA, 2018).
Despite this, some researchers describe the Sino‑African rela‑
tionship as multifaceted and mutually beneficial (FANTU; CYRIL, 2010) 
and view China as a partner for African development in areas such as en‑
trepreneurship, education and culture, pointing to numerous benefits in 
terms of infrastructures, job creation, increased productivity and higher 
living standards (ABODOHOUI; SU; DA SILVA, 2018), while others argue 
that if these investments are only benefitting the political elites and not 
the general population, the blame should not fall solely on the Chinese 
side but also on the shoulders of African leaders. (MLAMBO et al., 2016).
Quantifying China’s ODA to Africa is not a straightforward task. 
First, as we mentioned earlier, the information on the topic is scarce and 
difficult to access. Second, it is not easy to distinguish ODA from FDI in 
the territory because a large part of this investment is conducted through 
Chinese state‑owned enterprises that “should ideally help the States to 
fully play its national sovereign functions” (ABODOHOUI; SU; DA SIL‑
VA, 2018, p. 131). After analysing several sources, Besada and O’Bright 
(2017) suggest a value of US$75.4 billion between 2000 and 2011; on the 
other hand, Mlambo et al. (2016) propose rather different figures (over a 
very different period), identifying a total of US$37.7 billion in aid between 
1950 and 2009. What these different analyses have in common is that the 
amounts are always significant, which points to a strong relationship bet‑
ween China and Africa.
China also aims to promote integration in the African continent 
by supporting cross‑border projects and agreements with African sub‑re‑
gional organizations and continental financial organizations such as the 
African Development Bank. In a symbolically charged investment, China 
financed the construction of the new headquarters of the African Union.
The beginning of the 21st century saw a tremendous increase in 
trade between China and the African continent. The statistics show that 
the volume of trade increased by 1000% between 2001 and 2008 (MLAM‑
BO et al., 2016). By 2010, it had reached US$114.18 billion, making China 
17. By May 2019, China had committed 
2443 personnel to United Nations 
missions, 1041 of whom were deployed 
to the South Sudan mission. For more 
information on the Chinese blue helmets 
in South Sudan, see (UNITED NATIONS 
PEACEKEEPING, 2019).
In the first 10 months of 2013 alone, 
Chinese companies invested more than 
US$20 billion in Sudan’s oil sector and 
imported 1.9 million tons of oil from 
South Sudan (BESADA; O´BRIGHT, 
2017).
18. For Haroz (2011), Africa has six 
interests that drive its partnership with 
China: infrastructural development; 
direct investment; favourable loan 
terms; debt relief; expanding trade 
and sustaining growth rates; access 
to technology and professionalised 
training.
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Africa’s largest trading partner. In 2014, this value increased to US$221.5 
billion, corresponding to US$105.8 billion in imports from China and 
US$115.7 billion in exports, or an increase of 75% in trade volume in only 
four years (BESADA; O’BRIGHT, 2017)
Africa mainly exports natural resources, especially oil (China im‑
ports about 23% of its crude oil from Africa), and imports machinery, 
transport equipment and manufactured goods. However, that trade is 
quite concentrated, with 60% of Chinese exports going to six countries 
(South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco and Benin) and 70% of 
Chinese imports coming from only four countries (Angola, South Africa, 
Sudan, and Democratic Republic of the Congo) (RENARD, 2011). These 
data confirm what we already knew: that any studies on Africa should be 
mindful of the fact that Africa is not a homogeneous entity, but one that 
comprises 54 countries with distinct economic, financial, sociocultural 
and religious realities and very different regimes and systems of govern‑
ment. This means that global approaches do not reflect countries’ indivi‑
dual realities, often leading to unfounded generalisations.
China’s FDI in Africa seems to relate to trade and ODA, but its 
value is minimal when compared to China ś total FDI. This form of in‑
tervention in Africa was greatly encouraged by the Chinese government 
during the last decades of the 20th century as part of an internationalisa‑
tion strategy to support growth and economic reform in China.
By 1991, China’s FDI in Africa was US$1.5 million, representing 
0.2% of the country’s total FDI; in 2007, it had increased to US$4.46 bil‑
lion, or 5.9% of the total FDI) (RENARD, 2011). China increased its FDI 
again in 2016, when it reached US$7 billion, which was still only 4.4% 
of the China ś total FDI. However, in 2017 there was a drastic reversal, 
mainly due to policies to contain capital outflows, and the Chinese FDI 
in Africa fell to US$1 billion or 0.6% of China’s total FDI (HUANG, 2018). 
A significant part of Chinese investments is made through large 
state‑owned enterprises that receive state subsidies or loans, whose ac‑
tivities focus on natural resource exploitation and services such as the 
building of infrastructures. These large companies, as well as all their 
capital goods and labour, are imposed on African governments in return 
for loans and grants (ILHÉU, 2010). It should be stressed that these invest‑
ments are welcomed by African governments due to their positive impact 
on the local economy and development but also to China’s use of “soft 
power” (NYE, 1990) or even “sharp power” (NED, 2017)19. Moreover, Chi‑
na does not impose the strict rules required by organizations such as the 
European Union or the World Bank.
Currently, about 2200 Chinese companies continue to invest in the 
African continent despite numerous risks and challenges (ABODOHOUI; 
SU; DA SILVA, 2018).
Mozambique and China
The two countries have a longstanding relationship. The first re‑
cords of Chinese presence in Mozambique date back to the late 19th 
century, when Chinese emigrants settled in the then city of Lourenço 
19. The National Endowment for 
Democracy’s / International Forum for 
Democratic Studies coined the term in 
a December 2017 report “Soft Power’to 
‘Sharp Power’: Rising Authoritarian 
Influence in the Democratic World”. 
In the report “what we have to date 
understood as authoritarian “soft 
power” is better categorized as “sharp 
power” that pierces, penetrates, or 
perforates the political and information 
environments in the targeted countries. 
In the new competition that is under 
way between autocratic and democratic 
states, the repressive regimes’ “sharp 
power” techniques should be seen as 
the tip of their dagger - or indeed as 
their syringe”.
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Marques. They were well received because they provided a cheap skilled 
workforce (an alternative to the more expensive European workers), whi‑
ch the country needed to build infrastructure such as public buildings, 
railways and seaports (MEDEIROS, 2007).
This community was mainly based in Beira and Lourenço Mar‑
ques. From the 1950s onwards it began to settle there with small indus‑
trial manufacturing units, and the younger generations, who had atten‑
ded the official schools, began to take on public roles and jobs in private 
institutions (MEDEIROS, 2007).
The relations between the new Government installed after the 1975 
Wars of Independence (particularly FRELIMO) and the People’s Republic 
of China date back to the early 1960s, when China provided training to 
FRELIMO guerrillas (GARCIA, 2003). After Mozambique became inde‑
pendent, these relations were maintained and strengthened, with both 
countries formalising their diplomatic relations and establishing techni‑
cal and even financial support and cooperation agreements. The relations 
between the two countries naturally changed as the international con‑
text evolved. While the bond between them was essentially ideological in 
the past, today, more than forty years after Mozambique’s independence, 
it is mainly economic. Chris Alden and Sérgio Chichava (eds.) provide a 
detailed account of this evolution in the book China and Mozambique: 
From comrades to capitalists (CHICHAVA; ALDEN, 2014).
Paula Roque and Chris Alden (2014) describe the relations between 
the two countries as prudent and committed but also collaborative. The‑
se characteristics also describe the relationship between China and other 
African countries. The authors argue that Mozambique is still under 
strong influence by the Bretton Woods Institutions, international donors, 
western NGOs and local civil society. Furthermore, the activities of the 
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) greatly influence and limit 
the economic policies of the Mozambican government, and the authors 
add that more than 50% of the Mozambican state budget comes from 
foreign financial aid (ROQUE; ALDEN, 2014).
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world. Accord‑
ing to data from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
it was ranked 180th in the Human Development Index in 2018, which 
means it has very low scores in socioeconomic indicators. More than 
62.9% of the population lives on less than US$2 a day (UNITED NA‑
TIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 2018).
In the first decade of the 21st century, Mozambique had an aver‑
age growth of 8% per year, mainly due to the funding of megaprojects 
and international assistance. From 2006 onwards the country’s econom‑
ic growth was sustained by significant investments in coal mining, the 
agricultural industry, construction sector services and in other indus‑
tries(ROQUE 2009).
The World Bank has stated that the country is currently recovering 
from the recent episode of macroeconomic volatility and is having trou‑
ble achieving economic growth. After the remarkable growth of the last 
decade, the growth rate fell to 3.8% (less than half) in 2016. In 2017 there 
was another slight decrease to 3.7%, and in 2018 the growth rate was a 
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mere 3.3%, with the economy still struggling to cope with the downturn 
that followed the debt crisis of 2016 (WORLD BANK, 2018).
The economy has slowed down due to a series of shocks, which in‑
cluded political and internal security instability, the decrease in the price 
of raw materials and adverse weather conditions. Another noteworthy 
factor was the “suspension of external support to the State Budget and 
the Balance of Payments by cooperation partners and the suspension of 
the International Monetary Fund programme for Mozambique follo‑
wing the discovery of undisclosed government debt” (BANK OF MO‑
ZAMBIQUE, 2016).
In addition to this weak growth, Mozambique is burdened by pu‑
blic debt, which rose from 40% to 115% of the GDP between 2006 and 
2015 (BRANCO, 2017), reaching 128.3% in 2016 (INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, 2008) and 111.9 % in 2017, corresponding to a public 
debt of US$10.3 billion (MACAUHUB, 2018a).
In 2012, China increased its financing by 160% compared to pre‑
vious years, becoming the largest lender to Mozambique. In 2014, Mo‑
zambique’s total debt to China was US$886 million (MACQUEEN, 2018). 
Following the FOCAC summit of 2000, China announced the cancella‑
tion of US$22 million of Mozambique’s external public debt, and cancelled 
another US$52 million between 2001 and 2007, which corresponds to all 
accumulated debt between 1980 and 2005 (MUIANGA; NORFOLK, 2017).
At the 2015 FOCAC summit, China announced another cancella‑
tion of non‑overdue interest until that year and a downward revision of 
interest rates on credits to be allocated in the coming years. Despite these 
relief and debt cancellation policies as a form of aid to Mozambique, in 
2017 China remained Mozambique’s second largest individual creditor20. 
According to the Report and Opinion of the Administrative Court on 
the 2017 State General Account, Chinese loans totalled US$1.8 billion, 
corresponding to 38.3% of Mozambique’s total debt to third States. The 
document also states that, between December 2016 and December 2017, 
the country’s debt to China increased by US$200 million, which did not 
include the debt incurred with the construction of Xai‑Xai airport. The 
cost of facilities such as the Zimpeto National Stadium, the new Mavala‑
ne airport, the new Presidency building, the Circular Road, the Maputo‑
‑Katembe bridge, and the migration of the television and radio networks 
from analogue to digital were the main causes of the spike in public debt 
from only US$342 million in 2012/2013 (MACAUHUB, 2018a).
Trade relations between China and Mozambique
The ties between the two countries were renewed at the beginning 
of the 21st century. In 2001, an Economic and Trade Joint Committee was 
established, followed by several important bilateral agreements21. Also 
important was the founding, in 2003, of a Forum for Economic and Tra‑
de Cooperation between China and Portuguese‑speaking countries. The 
Forum, with headquarters in Macau, was created on China’s initiative to 
promote trade relations between its member countries, as well as to deve‑
lop and implement common projects in various domains (ILHÉU, 2010).
20. Mozambique’s largest lender is the 
International Development Association 
(IDA), a World Bank organization that 
has loaned the country a total of US$2.5 
billion (MACAUHUB, 2018a).
21. The following agreements were 
signed: 2001 – agreement on trade; 
agreement on the promotion and 
reciprocal protection of investments; 
2002 - agreement on human 
resources development, agriculture 
and environmental protection; 2004 - 
economic and technical cooperation 
agreement for agriculture, health, 
education and mining; 2007 - agreement 
to strengthen bilateral trade and 
economic relations for the period 2008-
2009; 2007 - protocol of cooperation on 
military assistance; 2014 - cooperation 
agreement between the Bank of 
Mozambique and the People’s Bank 
of China. For more on this topic see: 
Macqueen (2018).
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The economic involvement between the two countries is reflected 
in increased trade ties. According to data from the Statistical Yearbook 
(INE, 2018), China is the fifth largest market for Mozambican exports. In 
2017, exports from Mozambique to China reached US$252,608 million, 
corresponding to 5.35% of all exports, and the economic growth rate 
was 3.7% per year. In the fourth quarter of 2018 alone, these exports to‑
talled US$164,544 million, corresponding to 12.29% of total exports, and 
the main exports were timber, natural sands, titanium ores, and seeds 
(INE, 2018). In 2011, the export volume reached US$167,692 million, or 
4.7% of all exports.
Meanwhile, in 2017, imports totalled US$493,355 million, or 
8.59% of the total. In the fourth quarter of 2018, the import volume was 
US$187,837 million, or 10.22% of the total, and the main imports were pe‑
troleum oil, tyres and vehicles (INE, 2019). As we mentioned earlier, this 
value amounted to US$374,659 million in 2011, or 5.9% of total imports 
(INE, 2012).
The specific case of timber exports is worth examining more close‑
ly. Mozambique is one of the largest exporters of timber to China and 
China “is the destination for approximately 93 per cent of all Mozam‑
bique’s timber exports” (MACQUEEN, 2018, p. 8). About 50% of this 
wood is illegally exported22. Illegal logging has been widely discussed and 
studied due to concerns over its impact on the environment and on the 
sustainable development of the forest and its populations (MACQUEEN, 
2018; MUIANGA; NORFOLK, 2017; ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012).
Cooperation and Official Development Assistance in Mozambique
Estimating the Chinese ODA to Mozambique is not an easy task 
due to the reasons already mentioned in this study – it is difficult to dis‑
tinguish ODA from what is in fact FDI. For example, in 1997‑1998, the Ex‑
port‑Import Bank of China (ExIm Bank)23 created a fund of US$20 million 
to encourage Chinese companies to do business in Mozambique “(…) and 
to build a new embassy and a commerce centre administered by the Eco‑
nomic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office in downtown Maputo (…)” 
(ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012, p 14).
With the end of the Civil War in Mozambique, China’s aid in‑
creased. This financing helped build the new Parliament, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Joaquim Chissano Conference Centre, as well as 
to build military housing for soldiers. The aid also came in the form of 
donated military equipment and training (ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012).
China and Mozambique have bilateral cooperation agreements in 
areas such as health, education, agriculture, infrastructure, and securi‑
ty and defence. This support consists of grants, technical assistance, and 
interest‑free or low‑interest loans (CHICHAVA, 2012). The list provided 
here is not comprehensive and includes only those which we considered 
to be the most significant.
The Umbeluzi Agricultural Institute, the first pilot project for agri‑
cultural technology cooperation, was established in the wake of FOCAC 
2006. That same year, a soft loan of US$50 million was granted to build 
22. A 2012 report by the Environmental 
Investigation Agency states that 
“Chinese customs statistics show the 
import of 230.000 cubic meters of logs 
from Mozambique in 2011; conversely, 
Mozambique’s data shows just 36.000 
cubic meters of logs being shipped 
to China that year. This indicates 
widespread mis-declaration at the 
point of export, with containers of 
logs banned from export being falsely 
described as sawn timber” (EIA, 2012)
23. The ExIm Bank requires that the 
buildings for which the loans are 
intended be built by Chinese companies.
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three processing plants and to import agricultural machinery and tech‑
nology (EKMAN, 2012).
This bilateral cooperation was further strengthened with President 
Hu Jintao’s visit to Mozambique in 2007. President Hu Jintao pledged an 
additional US$170 million in loans and cooperation in the areas of agricul‑
ture, technology, education, health, the economy, and natural resource 
exploration. During the visit, China granted Mozambique a concessional 
loan of about US$40 million for the construction of three buildings for 
the Attorney General’s Office and a concessional loan of US$15.4 million 
to build a national stadium in Maputo with the capacity to hold 42 thou‑
sand people (CORREIA, 2010).
That same year, an agreement was signed with the Eduardo 
Mondlane University to conduct research on rural development and ag‑
riculture (ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012). China also contributes to the tour‑
ism sector by listing Mozambique as a tourist destination for Chinese 
citizens. Mozambique is one of the African countries classified as a “rec‑
ommended” destination for Chinese tourists. The Chinese Government 
also increased the number of Mozambican duty‑free products from 190 
to 442 (CORREIA, 2010). In terms of military cooperation, a military 
assistance protocol was signed between the Armed Forces General Staffs 
of both countries and the Chinese Government also granted US$1.5 mil‑
lion to refurbish several departments of the Mozambican armed forces 
(ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012).
In 2008, both countries signed a Cooperation Agreement on Scien‑
tific and Technological Innovation. The agreement had three main goals: 
to increase agricultural research activities by financing the Centre for 
Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer in the district of Boane 
and the Moamba Technological Park; to create a health science centre 
for research in infectious diseases; and to train Mozambican staff in Mas‑
ters and PhD programmes in China (CORREIA, 2010). That same year, 
a group of about 100 Chinese experts, which included a team from the 
Hunan Hybrid Rice Institute, arrived in Mozambique to support the irri‑
gation channel network project (MACAUHUB, 2008).
Sérgio Chichava (2010) lists several grants to Mozambique between 
2007 and 2012. China provided assistance to flood victims (US$400 thou‑
sand) and funded the construction of four schools in Maputo, Gaza, Nam‑
pula and Niassa (about US$3 million) and a Centre for the Prevention and 
Treatment of Malaria in Maputo. This centre, and the centre in Boane 
mentioned above, were part of a list of Chinese promises to African coun‑
tries at FOCAC 2006. Earlier 2019, China announced that it had granted 
36 scholarships for first degree students and 5 scholarships for Master’s 
students in the 2019/2020 school year (MACAUHUB, 2019).
China’s FDI in Mozambique
In 1999, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co‑
operation invested US$12 million to establish the Centre  for  Investment Pro-
motion Development and Trade of China (CPIDCC) in Maputo, one of eleven in‑
vestment promotion centres set up in Africa by the Chinese government. 
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The centre works with the CPI to facilitate Chinese investment in Mo‑
zambique (HON et al., 2010).
According to a report by the Centre for Chinese Studies of the 
Stellenbosch University, data from the CPI shows that between 1990 (the 
year China started investing in Mozambique) and 2007, China’s FDI in 
Mozambique was US$148 million, of which US$69 million were invested 
after 2003 (HON et al., 2010). The following year (2008), China invested 
US$76.8 million in the territory, becoming the second largest investor af‑
ter South Africa (HON et al., 2010). 
During the first decade of the 21st century, 80% of China’s FDI in 
Mozambique went to four investment projects, three in the industrial 
sector and one in the aquaculture and fisheries sector24 However, despite 
these significant figures, during the first decade of the century the Chi‑
nese investment in Mozambique represented only 2% of the total FDI, 
which amounted to US$10.6 billion (CHICHAVA, 2010).
Until 2012, much of China’s investment was concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector (77%), followed by aquaculture and fisheries (12%) 
and agriculture, agroindustry and construction (4%) (CHICHAVA, 2010). 
The projects funded by these investments were mainly based in Maputo. 
Today, the Chinese FDI in Mozambique focuses on building infrastruc‑
ture and on the forestry, agriculture and mining sectors. 
This investment in infrastructure has helped to build several 
government buildings and renew the road network. There are several 
Chinese construction companies which regularly outbid other foreign 
companies in the international tenders issued by the Government or 
the World Bank (ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012). Thanks to their competi‑
tive prices, Chinese companies are responsible for carrying out more 
than one third of the country’s road construction and are involved in 
the rehabilitation of urban water supply systems in Maputo, Beira and 
Quelimane. This state of affairs has been widely protested by compa‑
nies with Mozambican capital, who complain of unfair competition 
(NIELSEN, 2012). Moreover, there have been numerous reports of la‑
bour disputes in Chinese companies (BUNKENBORG, 2012; FEIJÓ, 
2012; WETHAL, 2017).
In 2006, the Mozambican government loaned US$2.3 billion from 
the ExIm Bank to build the Mphanda Nkuwa Dam on the Zambezi Riv‑
er, US$300 million to build the Moamba‑Major Dam, US$100 million 
to build three sports stadiums (CORREIA, 2010), and took out another 
smaller loan to refurbish the capital’s airport (ALVES, 2005).
During Prime Minister Aires de Aly’s visit to China in 2010, the 
Chinese government declared its intention to fund several projects in 
Mozambique, for a total of about US$172 million in the form of grants, 
interest‑free loans and low‑interest loans (CHICHAVA, 2010). Later, in 
August 2011, during Mozambican President Armando Guebuza’s visit to 
China, an agreement on financial cooperation was signed with the Chi‑
na Development Bank (CBD). The agreement aimed to introduce trade 
credits for the private sector in Mozambique, as well as to fund public 
investment, which implied greater involvement of the CBD in the Mo‑
zambican financial sector (ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012).
24. The four investment projects are: an 
Africa Great Wall Cement Manufacturer 
plant in Marracuene; a CIF MOZ cement 
factory in Matutuine; the Hong & 
Binga Development Fishery Company, 
which operates in industrial fishing 
and shipbuilding, among other areas; 
and the Henan Haode Mozambique 
Industrial Park, which aims to develop 
a textile and clothing industry in 
Marracuene district.
121
Francisco Proença Garcia  China’s economic presence in Mozambique
In 2011, the Mozambican government compiled a list of projects 
to be developed in cooperation with the People’s Republic of China. Of 
these, twenty were deemed priorities in alleviating the infrastructure 
deficit (valued at US$1.398.2 million). The list was submitted to the Chi‑
nese government for consideration, and the approved projects were fund‑
ed through concessional loans from the ExIm Bank. More than 60% of 
these projects are in the infrastructure sector (refurbishment and mod‑
ernisation of the Maputo International Airport; construction of 900Km of 
power lines; construction of the new building of the Council of Ministers; 
construction of housing for officers of the State’s Intelligence and Security 
Services; construction of sports infrastructures, etc.) (CHICHAVA, 2010). 
As part of this investment, in 2012 the ExIm Bank began financing the cir‑
cular road project in Maputo (US$400 million) and the Maputo‑Katembe 
Bridge (US$1.1 billion), which was inaugurated in June 2018.
With millions of hectares of arable land (36 million), 19 million hec‑
tares of productive forest land and a vast river network, Mozambique has 
a remarkable agricultural potential. This potential has attracted Chinese 
FDI, which focused on logging projects in the first decade of the 21st cen‑
tury. During this period, four of the eight projects approved by the CPI 
were in logging and timber trade and two were in the food production 
sector. This investment represented only 4% of the total Chinese invest‑
ment for the same period (CHICHAVA, 2010).
Of over 700 forestry companies operating in Mozambique, more than 
200 have Chinese capital, and of the 289 forest concessions we identified, 
60 have been awarded to Chinese investors (CHICHAVA, 2010). To address 
the lack of standardised practices among these companies and concessions 
and encourage sustainable investment, the Chinese government issued a 
document titled “Guidelines for Sustainable Trade and Investment for For‑
est Products for Chinese Overseas Enterprises” (MACQUEEN, 2018).
In 2009, as part of its effort to support agricultural investment in 
the Zambezia Province, the ExIm Bank granted a loan of US$50 million 
to the Cabinet Planning for the Development of Zambezi Valley for agri‑
cultural projects in the valley. The funds were used to purchase agricul‑
tural machinery (US$20 million) and in industrial units in Tete, Zambeze 
and Manica (US$30 million) (ILHÉU, 2010).
FDI in Mozambique has focused on these mega projects. In the mi‑
ning sector, Brazil and India have made significant investments in the 
Moatize Coal mines, while the heavy sands mines in Moma (Angoche) 
are largely funded by Korean money. However, China did not invest hea‑
vily in mining during the first decade of the century, with only a few 
private mining companies operating in the gold mining and trading sec‑
tor. It was only in 2012 that Chinese companies began to show interest 
in the coal industry in Tete, with the China Kingho group and WISCO 
committing to initial investments of US$5 billion and US$800 million, 
respectively (CHINA DAILY, 2010). The China Kingho Group has also 
shown interest in research and exploration of oil, natural gas and other 
mineral resources (ILHÉU, 2010). 
The latest statistics issued by the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China show that 70% of Chinese FDI in Mozambique is allocated to 
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natural resources, including gas and oil (AFRICAN DAILY VOICE, 2019). 
In 2010, the Daqing Oilfield Drilling Engineering Company won an in‑
ternational tender to drill for natural gas in Mozambique (MACAUHUB, 
2010). Finally, the Africa Great Wall Cement Manufacturer was granted 
a license to mine for limestone and heavy mineral sands in the Angoche 
district (CHICHAVA, 2010). 
These recent investments in the mining, oil and gas sectors constitu‑
te a significant change in the patterns of Chinese FDI in Mozambique, whi‑
ch has not only increased but also become more geographically disperse.
In 2014, Chinese FDI had a significant impact on the industrial sec‑
tor with the inauguration of a car assembly plant in Maluana by Matched‑
je car, a company valued at US$50 million. The company eventually went 
bankrupt in 2018.
The Chinese FDI in Mozambique has grown noticeably, and there 
are over 100 Chinese companies operating in a variety of areas, such as 
energy, agriculture, fisheries, real estate, construction materials, tourism, 
transport, telecommunications, infrastructure and trade. According to 
data from the Chinese Embassy in Maputo, the accumulated Chinese 
FDI in the territory was already approaching US$6 billion by March 2017 
(MACAUHUB, 2017a) and would reach US$173 million in the first half of 
2017 (APIEX, 2017).
In 2018, the total FDI in Mozambique was US$2.3 billion, which 
marked a sharp decrease (26%) when compared to 2017. This indicator 
has been declining since 2013, when FDI in the country reached US$6.175 
billion. However, projects in the oil, natural gas and coal exploration sec‑
tors are beginning to attract Chinese investors and this indicator is expec‑
ted to recover in the medium to long term (UNCTAD, 2018).
Despite this sharp downturn in foreign investment, China conti‑
nues to invest in the territory. Holding 20% of the South Coral explora‑
tion project, the China National Petroleum Company is the second largest 
shareholder in the natural gas sector. This project has received US$4.8 
billion in funding from several organizations, including the ExIm Bank 
(MACAUHUB, 2017b). The Chinese ambassador in Maputo, JSu Jian, rei‑
terated China’s intentions to continue investing and recalled that there 
are several other projects in a list compiled by the Mozambican gover‑
nment in a memorandum of understanding signed in 2017. This memo‑
randum covers several priority areas (industrial parks, roads, agriculture, 
exploration of natural and energy resources and ports) (MACAUHUB, 
2018b).
The China Railways International Group is also expected to finish 
building a cabotage port in Chongoene and railway links to the Limpopo 
Corridor in Macarretane, as well as extensions to important projects such 
as the Chibuto heavy sands exploration project in Gaza and the Janga‑
mo project in Inhambane, which are valued at about US$3 billion (MA‑
CAUHUB, 2018c). The company will also build the new Save River Bridge 
in Inhambane province, which represents an investment of about US$100 
million (MACAUHUB, 2018d). Mozambique is currently negotiating fi‑
nancing to build a vocational and technical training institute in Gorongo‑
sa (MACAUHUB, 2018e). In 2016, at the Beijing Business Forum, the Mo‑
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zambican president challenged Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in four pi‑
votal areas: agriculture, energy, tourism and infrastructure (NYUSI, 2016). 
On 2nd September 2018, on the eve of the seventh FOCAC Sum‑
mit, the President of the Republic of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi opened a 
business forum in Beijing, during which Mozambique and China signed 
eight memorandums of understanding on infrastructure, industry, tele‑
communications, agriculture and financial services25.
In a clear demonstration of mutual interest in cementing the rela‑
tions between the two countries, Filipe Nyusi, attended the One Belt One 
Road Conference hosted by Beijing on 25th and 26th April 2019. On this oc‑
casion, Nyusi assured the Chinese President that he was personally inves‑
ted in the success of the initiative and highlighted the need to exchange 
experiences on governance (DIÁRIO DE NOTÍCIAS, 2019).
Conclusion 
China has made use of different instruments of power, such as mili‑
tary power projection and the FOCAC, to defend its interests in Africa. In 
order to achieve its goals, China has strengthened its diplomatic ties, expo‑
nentially increased its trade volume, provided ODA and facilitated coope‑
ration, and focused its investments in the exploration of natural resources. 
However, the Chinese presence is not evenly distributed across the 
continent. Africa is an entity that represents multiple countries, therefo‑
re, global approaches do not reflect countries’ individual realities, which 
often leads to unfounded generalisations. For example, China maintains 
trade relations with only half a dozen countries, and the Chinese FDI for 
the entire continent, albeit very significant (US$7 billion), represents only 
4.4% of the total Chinese FDI in 2016.
Much of China’s ODA and FDI is channelled through large state‑ow‑
ned enterprises, which are imposed on African governments with all their 
capital goods and labour in return for loans and grants. It should be stres‑
sed that China’s use of “soft power”, or even “sharp power”, is welcomed 
by African governments, mainly due to its impact on the economy and 
local development, but also because China does not impose the strict rules 
required by organizations such as the European Union or the World Bank.
Based on this analysis, we can conclude that, today, the relations 
between China and Africa are multifaceted and mutually beneficial. On 
the one hand, in terms of socioeconomic development, African countries 
greatly benefit from a strong and growing Chinese presence. On the 
other, China needs Africa’s markets, resources and political and diploma‑
tic support.
Mozambique, one of the countries with the lowest socioeconomic 
indicators in Africa, is currently coping with a strong debt burden and an 
economic downturn. By 2017, China had invested an accumulated value 
of over US$6 billion in the territory, becoming one of the country’s main 
economic partners and its second largest individual lender.
Mozambique currently views the longstanding relations between 
the two territories as cautious but both countries have committed to 
strengthening their bilateral economic cooperation ties.
25.  On 2nd September 2018, the 
portuguese newspaper Expresso 
reported that “In the infrastructure 
sector, memoranda were signed for 
the construction of a road between 
Niassa province, in the far northwest 
of the country, and Tanzania, and 
for the repair of National Road 
Number Six, linking the city of Beira, 
in Sofala, to the border village of 
Machipanda in Manica province. 
Another memorandum between the 
National Road Administration of 
Mozambique and the China Road 
and Bridge Corporation includes the 
construction of a road section between 
Pambara, in Vilanculos district, and 
Mangungumete, in Inhassoro district, 
in the southern province of Inhambane. 
Another document outlines the 
construction of an integrated transport 
system between the Limpopo Valley 
and the Chongoene port in southern 
Gaza province. Industrial parks in 
Boane and Marracuene, in the Maputo 
province, are part of the memorandum 
signed between the Mozambican 
Ministry of Industry and Trade and the 
China Civil Engineering Construction 
group. The Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food Security of Mozambique 
signed a memorandum with the China 
Railway 20 Bureau Group Corporation 
and the Northwest University. In the 
telecommunication’s technology sector, 
Chinese company Huawei signed 
a memorandum of understanding 
with Mozambique Mobile, while in 
the financial area Mozambican bank 
Millennium Bim signed a memorandum 
with UnionPay, a leading Chinese 
electronic payment systems company.” 
(EXPRESSO, 2018).
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These economic and trade links have gained new momentum in 
the current century. China is now the fifth largest market for Mozam‑
bican exports, and in 2017 it was the largest (legal and illegal) export 
market for Mozambican timber. That same year, China was also the 
country’s third largest importer, with a share of about 9% of all Mozam‑
bican imports. 
With the end of the Mozambican Civil War, China increased its 
ODA to Mozambique and signed cooperation agreements in areas such 
as health, agriculture, infrastructure, and security and defence. This 
assistance consists of grants, technical training (civilian and military), 
interest‑free or low‑interest loans and significant funding for public in‑
frastructures. China also provides funding for science and technology 
through scholarships and research and technology transfer centres, parti‑
cularly in the agriculture and health sectors.
Chinese investment in the country dates back to the 1990s and has 
been growing exponentially since. A large part of this investment is chan‑
nelled through large state‑owned enterprises, which mainly focus on 
manufacturing, natural resource exploration (minerals, agriculture and 
forest resources) and services such as facilities construction. The Mozam‑
bique government has made several investment requests to the Chinese 
state, which are compiled in a list of projects that have been submitted for 
consideration (totalling over €1 billion).
Despite the sharp decline in FDI since 2017, China continues to in‑
vest in Mozambique. However, the investment trend shows a transition 
from the industrial and agricultural sectors to the mineral resources and 
natural gas sector, significantly changing the geographical distribution of 
Chinese investments, which are moving from the south of the country to 
the centre and north of the territory, with all the socioeconomic and even 
security implications this entails.
The preceding study of China’s economic involvement in Mo‑
zambique provides a set of data and framework of analysis that may as‑
sist in understanding how China gains and projects power in other re‑
source‑rich African countries with similar political regimes, as in the case 
of Angola.  That said, this study is essentially focused on economic rela‑
tions.  And, of course, not all power is merely economic.  What is now 
required is a more comprehensive analysis of the nature and dynamic 
of politico‑diplomatic relations, and the role of economic ties therein, be‑
tween African states and China.
In conclusion, today, the Chinese presence in Mozambique is the 
result of a multifaceted and mutually beneficial economic relationship. 
Mozambique benefits from Chinese trade, investment and ODA, which 
have an important impact not only on its socioeconomic growth and 
development but also on making the country less dependent on tradi‑
tional donors, whereas China draws important diplomatic and economic 
benefits from its relationship with a country rich in natural resources. 
Furthermore, Mozambique holds an important geostrategic position and 
exerts a powerful influence throughout the entire east Africa region, con‑
trolling not only the Mozambique Channel but also all points of entry 
into the countries of the Southern Hinterland.
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